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A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME: SCHOOL PRAYER




Views on prayer in public schools have been sharply divided ever
since the Supreme Court affirmed the separation of church and state in
that setting.' Various political interest groups have repeatedly attempted
to "return God to the classroom" by introducing legislation aimed at re-
storing prayer to public schools.2 Since the terrorist attacks of September
11 th, 2001, there is a renewed interest in school prayer.3  Many state
governments are considering passing legislation mandating a "moment of
silence" or otherwise promoting prayer in public schools.4 The issue of
f Lee Ann Rabe: law clerk to the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo, U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois; B.A. in English, The Ohio State University; J.D., The Ohio State Uni-
versity Moritz College of Law, Class of 2003. I dedicate this article to my husband, Bryan Bowen,
who has ceaselessly supported and encouraged me throughout this process. I would also like to thank
Louis Jacobs and James Brudney for their support and guidance in developing this topic and this
article.
1. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962). Justice Black, writing for the majority, held
that use of a brief, non-denominational prayer each morning in the New York public schools was a
clear violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Id. at 424. The majority opinion
reminded us that freedom from government-imposed religion was one of the reasons colonists had
come to America in the first place. Id. at 425. The Court noted that the First Amendment was
adopted as a safeguard, "to stand as a guarantee that neither the power nor the prestige of the Federal
Government would be used to control, support or influence the kinds of prayer the American people
can say .. " Id. at 429.
The following year, the Court also prohibited Bible readings in public schools. Sch. Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963). The Court noted that the First Amendment was written to
ensure "a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority
by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion." Id. at 217 (citing
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1947)).
2. See infra Part IV (A).
3. See, e.g., Jodie Morse, Letting God Back In; Prayer, Long Banned from Schools, Is Mak-
ing a Post-terror Comeback, TIME, Oct. 22, 2001, at 71 (noting that "[s]ome teachers are broadcast-
ing morning blessings over the p.a. system or praying with distraught students."); Howard Fineman:
One Nation, Under... Who?, NEWSWEEK, July 8, 2002, at 20 (noting the resurgence of religious
speech by political leaders since the attacks).
4. Examples of this legislation include (but are not limited to): the Religious Speech
Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 81, 107th Cong. (2001) (introduced in December 2001 by U.S. Rep. Ernest
Istook); H.R. 1142, 146th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2002); Idaho H.J.M. 17; H.C.R. 5050, 79th
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2002); H.C.R. 19, 91st Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2002);
H.J.R. 635, 102d Gen. Assem. (Tenn. 2002); H.J.R. 682, 102d Gen. Assem. (Tenn. 2002) (all calling
on Congress to pass a constitutional amendment allowing voluntary school prayer); H.C.R. 22, 91st
Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2002) (calling for federal legislation allowing voluntary school
prayer); Missouri H.C.R. 30 (proposing a constitutional amendment allowing voluntary school
prayer); H.B. 1446, 157th Gen. Ct., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2001) (requiring students to recite the
Lord's Prayer at the beginning of each day); H.B. 676, 185th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2001)
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prayer in public schools has also re-emerged in the federal court system,
in the guise of objections to the words "under God" in the Pledge of Al-
legiance.5 Also, at least one candidate for state governor wants to make
returning prayer to public schools a major plank in his campaign.6 In
Wallace v. Jaffree,7 the Court held that laws creating a moment of silence
are unconstitutional if the purpose is to promote religion; however, the
Court seemed to leave open the possibility that moment of silence laws,
enacted without such motivations, might be constitutional.
For a movement that has been seeking to reintroduce prayer in
schools for more than 40 years, the potential loophole left open by the
Court in Jaffree appears to be a golden opportunity when combined with
increased popular support for prayer in general following the September
1 lth attacks. 8 How much of an opportunity actually exists depends on the
exact parameters of the Court's view on moment of silence laws. Since
Jaffree, however, the Court has declined to clarify its position by taking
another case on these laws.9 Given the Court's silence, interested parties
can only attempt to infer the direction of the Court from other sources
including the Court's recent related Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
The recent case Doe v. School Board of Ouachita Parish1° in Louisiana
illustrates the connection between moment of silence laws and school
prayer, and also serves as another guidepost in the murky landscape left
by the Supreme Court.
This Article explores the possible direction of the Court in this area.
Part II analyzes Wallace v. Jaffree, the seminal Supreme Court case
striking down legislation requiring religiously motivated moments of
silence in schools. Part III examines some of the state challenges to
moment of silence laws since Jaffree and the rationales courts have used
(requiring the Department of Education to request all school districts to begin each school day with
prayer or a short period of meditation); H.B. 541, Biennium Adj. Sess. (Vt. 2002) (requiring schools
to begin each day with a short prayer).
5. See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussed more fully infra
note 132 and accompanying text).
6. Governor Rick Perry, re-elected in 2002 to a full four-year term as Texas governor, sup-
ports a return to public school prayer, at least partially in response to the terrorist attacks. He sees
"no problem with ignoring the U.S. Supreme Court ban on organized school prayer 'at this very
crisis moment in our history."' Meighan, Editorial, Perry's Stand on Prayer Sends a Bad Message,
CORPUS CHRIST[ CALLER-TIMES, Nov. 3, 2001, at A15. Senator David Scott (D-Ga.) was elected in
2002 to represent Georgia's 13th Congressional District. Scott campaigned on the issue of restoring
prayer to public schools through legislation making the requirement of a moment of silence legal.
Ready to Represent Georgia, JET, Sept. 16, 2002, at 34.
7. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
8. See infra Part IV for a more detailed explanation of the road from school prayer to mo-
ment of silence statutes.
9. Most recently, the Court denied certiorari to a case challenging the Virginia moment of
silence statute, Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 270 (4th Cir. 2001) (affirming holding that the
statute did not unconstitutionally establish religion), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 996 (2001).
10. 274 F.3d 289 (5th Cir. 2001) (striking down a Louisiana statute validating vocal prayer in
public schools, which had formerly contained the word "silent," but was recently modified to allow
vocal prayer).
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for sustaining or striking down these statutes." Finally, Part IV outlines
why public school moment of silence statutes, as stand-ins for school
prayer, must be unconstitutional as a violation of the Establishment
Clause.
II. THE COURT SPEAKS: WALLACE V. JAFFREE12
The Supreme Court's first, and only, statement about moment of si-
lence laws came in 1985. Wallace v. Jaffree13 settled a challenge to a
1981 Alabama statute 14 authorizing a one-minute period of silence in
public schools "for meditation or voluntary prayer."' 5  The plaintiff,
Ishmael Jaffree, on behalf of his school-age children, sought an injunc-
tion against the application of this statute, claiming it violated the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. 16  The defendants argued that the First
Amendment, and therefore the Establishment Clause, did not apply to the
states but only to the federal government.' 7 Further, the State argued that
the Fourteenth Amendment did not and was never intended to subject the
states to the restrictions of the First Amendment.'
8
After a lengthy trial, with testimony from state officials including
the primary sponsor of the amendment, State Senator Donald G.
Holmes, 19 the District Court reviewed the history of the First and Four-
11. Four state "moment of silence laws" have been challenged since Jaffree. Two were
upheld-Bown v. Gwinnett Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d 1464 (1 1th Cir. 1997), and Brown v. Gilmore, 258
F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2001)-and two were struck down as unconstitutional-May v. Cooperman, 780
F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985), and Doe v. Ouachita Sch. Rd., 274 F.3d 289 (5th Cir. 2001).
12. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
13. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 38.
14. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984).
At the commencement of the first class of each day [in all grades] in all public schools
the teacher in charge of the room in which each such class is held may announce that a
period of silence, not to exceed one minute in duration, shall be observed for mediation,
and during any such period of silence shall be maintained and no other activities shall be
engaged in.
Id. Two other statutes-ALA. CODE §§ 16-1-20 & 20.2 (Supp. 1984) were also challenged in the
original complaint. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 41-42. The plaintiffs dropped their claim that section 16-1-
20, which provided for a period of silence for meditation, was unconstitutional. Id. Section 16-1-
20.2, which provided for teacher-led prayers at the start of the school day, was held to be unconstitu-
tional by both the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and by the Supreme Court, and was not
at issue in Jaffree. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 41-42.
15. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984). The 1984 amendment actually added the words
"voluntary prayer" to the statute, which had previously only called for a moment of silence for
meditation.
16. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 42-43 (stating that the original complaint simply asked that the school
be enjoined from imposing religious services and prayers on the public school students, while a later
amendment to the complaint specified the portions of the Alabama Code at issue).
17. Jaffree v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1113 (S.D. Ala. 1983).
18. Id. The defendants also argued that if religion were to be banned from public schools, so-
called "secular humanism" would also need to be removed from the curriculum. Id. Since "[s]uch a
purge" would be difficult if not impossible, the defendants argued that other religions must also be
permitted to remain. Id.
19. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 43. Senator Holmes testified that he had no secular purpose in mind
when he introduced the amendment adding "voluntary prayer" to the Alabama statute in question.
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teenth Amendments. 20  The District Court held that the Establishment
Clause does not prevent states from establishing a religion and upheld
the moment of silence law.21  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the District Court.22 The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
the First Amendment did apply to the states as well as to the federal gov-
ernment and that the law was unconstitutional as a violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause.23
Writing for a five-Justice majority, Justice Stevens affirmed the
holding below that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,
through the Fourteenth Amendment, applied to the states, as well as to
the federal government.24 He stressed the central importance of the idea
that individuals must be free not only to worship as they choose, but also
to refrain from worshipping at all, if they so choose. 2 5  Governments,
both state and federal, must respect this "basic truth"-that individuals
cannot be forced by the State to either abandon or embrace religion.
26
Justice Stevens applied the Lemon test, formulated to evaluate Es-
tablishment Clause challenges, to the Alabama law. 27 This test consists
Id. His sole intention was an "effort to return voluntary prayer to our public schools ... it is a be-
ginning and a step in the right direction." Id.
20. Jaffree, 554 F. Supp. at 1113, 1125 (concluding that the purpose of the First Amendment
was to ensure that the federal government would not interfere with the states' right to establish
official religions, and that the Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to apply the First
Amendment to the states).
21. Id. at 1128 (acknowledging that its decision was against the force of Supreme Court
precedent, but felt that the previous decisions were wrongly made and felt "a stronger tug from the
Constitution which it ha[d] sworn to support and to defend" than from adherence to precedent). Id. at
1126-28.
22. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (1983). The court of appeals chastised the district court
for acting against Supreme Court precedent, emphasizing the doctrine that lower courts are bound by
the decisions of higher courts:
The district court attempted to justify its actions by discussing the limited exceptions to
the doctrine of stare decisis. The doctrine of stare decisis pertains to the deference a court
may give to its own prior decisions. The stare decisis doctrine and its exceptions do not
apply where a lower court is compelled to apply the precedent of a higher court.
Id. at 1532 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The court of appeals also noted that the Supreme
Court had rejected the narrower interpretation of the Establishment Clause that the district court
clung to. Id. at 1530. It also noted the Court's unanimity "regarding the history of the first amend-
ment's applicability to the states through the fourteenth amendment." Id. at 1531.
23. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 61.
24. Id. at 48-49. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the portion of the appellate deci-
sion that overturned the district court's holding that the First Amendment did not restrict the states.
Id. Stevens briefly elaborated on this affirmation, citing a long string of Supreme Court cases that
have held the First Amendment applicable to the states as well as to the federal government. Id.
25. Id. at 53 (stating that "[this] Court has unambiguously concluded that the individual
freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any religious
faith or none at all.").
26. Id. at 55 (quoting Justice Jackson, "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constella-
tion, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.").
27. Id. at 55 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)). The Establishment
Clause test first articulated in Lemon has been modified slightly by later cases, including Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (modifying the criteria used to assess whether aid to religion has an
impermissible effect).
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of three prongs: first, that there is a secular purpose for the law; second,
that the primary effect of the law must not be to advance or inhibit relig-
ion; and third, that the law not cause excessive entanglement between the
government and religion.28 Justice Stevens only examined the first prong
of the three-prong test, however, as the Court found that the Alabama
law had no secular purpose.29  Both the text of the statute30 and state-
ments by State Senator Donald G. Holmes, the bill's sponsor,31 indicated
that the statute had a purely religious purpose-returning prayer to public
schools. For the majority of the Court, the fact that the statute clearly
and solely had a religious purpose eliminated the need to examine the
second and third prongs of the Lemon test.32  Thus, the Court struck
down the Alabama statute as a violation of the First Amendment.
33
In reaching this conclusion, the majority also noted the importance
of the special setting involved-the public schools. Justice Stevens
stated that the "indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to
conform" is of special concern in the public school setting. 34  He ex-
panded on the special significance of the public school setting by citing
several previous cases where the Court acknowledged the role peer pres-
sure plays in school settings. 35 Justice Stevens especially worried about
the potential impact of peer pressure, citing Justice Frankfurter's earlier
concerns, "That a child is offered an alternative may reduce the con-
straint; it does not eliminate the operation of influence by the school in
matters sacred to conscience and outside the school's domain. The law
of imitation operates, and non-conformity is not an outstanding charac-
teristic of children.,
36
Both Justice O'Connor and Justice Powell concurred in the majority
decision, but separately maintained that some moment of silence laws
might well be constitutional.37 Justice O'Connor explained that moment
28. Id. at 55-56 (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13). The Lemon test is discussed in more
detail infra in Part IV.
29. Id. at 56.
30. Id. at 60 (finding the text of the Alabama statute problematic because it calls for "volun-
tary prayer" from the students and that the addition of the word "prayer" to the statute was seen as an
attempt by the legislature to promote "prayer as a favored practice").
31. Id. at 43 (quoting Senator Holmes' explanation "that the bill was an 'effort to return
voluntary prayer to our public schools... it is a beginning and a step in the right direction'). Sena-
tor Holmes also made it clear that he "had no other purpose in mind," other than restoring prayer to
public schools. Id. at 57.
32. Id. at 56 (stating that this factor was dispositive).
33. Id. at 61.
34. Id. at 61 n.51 (citing Engel, 370 U.S. at 430).
35. Id. (citing Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227) (1948) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (noting that when governmental support is given to a specific religious belief,
there is pressure put on religious minorities to conform); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 290 (voicing concern
that students might participate in religious activities to avoid being stigmatized); Marsh v. Cham-
bers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (distinguishing between adults not being very susceptible to 'reli-
gious indoctrination' and children who are subject to peer pressure).
36. Id. at 61 (quoting McCollum, 333 U.S. at 227) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 62, 72 (Powell, J., concurring) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
20041
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of silence laws were not inherently unconstitutional: first, they are not
"inherently religious;" 38 second, a moment of silence does not coerce a
student into "compromis[ing] his or her beliefs. '39 The primary concern
according to O'Connor was whether the state "has conveyed or at-
tempted to convey the message that children should use the moment of
silence for prayer."40  To determine if the state has done this, Justice
O'Connor would look to the circumstances surrounding the enactment of
the moment of silence law, specifically, "the history, language, and ad-
ministration of a particular statute." '' Justice Powell largely agreed with
Justice O'Connor, and would also find a moment of silence law constitu-
tional if there was a clear secular purpose for the law.42
While the Court's decision in Jaffree settled the question of Ala-
bama's statute, the more general question of moment of silence statutes
was left at least partially open. Since 1985, the Court has refused to de-
finitively answer that question, denying certiorari in moment of silence
cases. Part 11H of this Article examines the four appellate moment of
silence decisions since Jaffree; two circuit courts have upheld such stat-
utes, and two have invalidated them. Part IV considers the potential un-
constitutionality of all moment of silence laws, attempting to read be-
tween the lines and determine the future of the Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.
III. INTO THE FUTURE: STATE CHALLENGES SINCE JAFFREE
The overall picture of the constitutionality of moment of silence
laws remains murky. Since Jaffree was decided in 1985, only a few
states have had constitutional challenges to their own moment of silence
laws. Two of these states upheld the moment of silence laws as constitu-
tional,43 and two struck down the law as unconstitutional." Because the
Supreme Court has yet to take a moment of silence case since Jaffree,
these lower court rationales serve as the only guideposts for the constitu-
tionality, or lack thereof, of such laws.
38. Id. at 72.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 73.
41. Id. at 74.
42. Id. at 66.
43. The statutes of both Georgia (1997) and Virginia (2001) were upheld by the circuit courts.
Bown v. Gwinnett County Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1464, 1474 (1lth Cir. 1997); Brown v. Gilmore, 258
F.3d 265, 282 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 996 (2001).
44. The statutes of both New Jersey (1985) and Louisiana (2001) were struck down by the
circuit courts for violating the Establishment Clause. May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240, 253 (3d Cir.
1985); Doe v. Sch. Bd., 274 F.3d 289, 295 (5th Cir. 2001).
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A. Sustained-Georgia and Virginia
Both the Fourth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have up-
held moment of silence laws.45 In doing so, both Courts focused on the
first prong of the Lemon test, finding secular purposes for the laws.46 No
religious purpose was given for the Georgia statute. A religious purpose
was given for the Virginia statute, but it was accompanied by several
secular purposes. The secular purposes in both statutes are similar: both
claim to provide students with a quiet moment to start the school day,
allowing them to collect their thoughts. The Virginia statute also claims
the purpose of promoting the values of the Free Exercise clause of the
47First Amendment, which the court claims is a secular purpose.
Despite the courts' holdings regarding secular purposes for these
statutes, suggestions of an underlying religious purpose remain. Geor-
gia's statute, while specifically stating that the moment of silence is not
religiously motivated, also expressly ensures that no voluntary student
prayer is prevented and suggests that the first two provisions must impli-
cate student prayer.48 The court dismissed the concerns over this provi-
sion, characterizing it simply as a preventative measure against misinter-
45. The text of the Georgia statute reads:
§ 20-2-1050. Brief period of quiet reflection authorized; nature of period
(a) In each public school classroom, the teacher in charge shall, at the opening of school
upon every school day, conduct a brief period of quiet reflection for not more than 60
seconds with the participation of all the pupils therein assembled.
(b) The moment of quiet reflection authorized by subsection (a) of this Code section is
not intended to be and shall not be conducted as a religious service or exercise but shall
be considered as an opportunity for a moment of silent reflection on the anticipated ac-
tivities of the day.
(c) The provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this Code section shall not prevent stu-
dent initiated voluntary school prayers at schools or school related events which are non-
sectarian and nonproselytizing in nature.
GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1050 (1996).
The text of the Virginia statute reads:
§ 22.1-203. Daily observance of one minute of silence
In order that the right of every pupil to the free exercise of religion be guaranteed within
the schools and that the freedom of each individual pupil be subject to the least possible
pressure from the Commonwealth either to engage in, or to refrain from, religious obser-
vation on school grounds, the school board of each school division shall establish the
daily observance of one minute of silence in each classroom of the division.
During such one-minute period of silence, the teacher responsible for each classroom
shall take care that all pupils remain seated and silent and make no distracting display to
the end that each pupil may, in the exercise of his or her individual choice, meditate,
pray, or engage in any other silent activity which does not interfere with, distract, or im-
pede other pupils in the like exercise of individual choice.
The Office of the Attorney General shall intervene and shall provide legal defense of this law.
VA. CODE. ANN. § 22.1-203 (2000).
46. While both courts do go on to examine the second and third prongs of the Lemon test,
neither court dwells very long on those issues. Bown, 112 F.3d at 1472-74; Brown, 258 F.3d at 277-
78.
47. The court observed that "the Establishment Clause [does not] preclude a government from
,accommodating' religious scruple .... Brown, 258 F.3d at 274. The court held that the intent to
accommodate religious practices is a secular purpose, not a religious one. Id. at 276.
48. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1050(c) (1996).
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pretation of the first two provisions in the statute. 49 The legislative his-
tory surrounding the statute also provided evidence of latent religious
motivations.50 However, the court downplayed these motivations, draw-
ing a distinction between "the legislative purpose of the statute... [and]
the possibly religious motives of the legislators who enacted the law. 51
Drawing such a distinction seems disingenuous,5 2 as the court appeared
willing to look past even the type of motivations that the Jaffree Court
held unconstitutional.5 3
Virginia, too, appears to have religious motives lurking behind its
moment of silence statute. The plain language of the statute mentions
prayer as a potential exercise during the minute of silence. 4 When the
Fourth Circuit analyzed the statutory language, it dismissed the mention
of prayer as just one of a list of potential practices. Additionally, the
legislative history suggested a religious motivation for the statute, which
was also swept away by the court. The court focused on the aspects of
the legislative history that support a secular purpose,56 while ignoring
those aspects that support a religious purpose.5 7 The court even looked
past the fact that the same Virginia legislature passed a joint resolution
opposing the holding of Engel v. Vitale and calling for a constitutional
amendment to restore prayer to the public classroom. 58  Although the
49. Bown, 112 F.3d at 1474.
50. The original bill was to create a time for prayer in the classroom, not merely a moment of
quiet reflection. Several legislators also spoke fervently about the reintroduction of prayer into the
public schools, and an amendment referring specifically to school prayer was "overwhelmingly
supported." See Larry R. Thaxton, Silence Begets Religion: Bown v. Gwinnett County School Dis-
trict and the Unconstitutionality of Moments of Silence in Public Schools, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1399,
1430-31 (1996).
51. Bown, 112 F.3d at 1471-72.
52. If legislative purpose is not a composite of the individual motives of those legislators who
enact a statute, what is it?
53. Now that the Eleventh Circuit has upheld Georgia's statute as constitutional, state legisla-
tors seem more willing to explicitly encourage prayer during the mandated moment of silence. On
January 31, 2002, Georgia legislators introduced a bill that would "clarify" the uses of the moment
of silence, reminding students that their First Amendment rights entitle them to pray during that
moment if they so choose. See H.B. 1171, 146th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2002). See also S.B.
402, 146th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2002) (providing for similar clarification). The Georgia
Senate has also introduced a bill that would provide a three-minute period for students to voluntarily
speak about their religious beliefs. This "educational period" would be held immediately before the
mandated moment of silence. See S.B. 331, 146th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2002).
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-203 (2000).
55. Brown, 258 F.3d at 276.
56. Id. at 277 (emphasizing the use of a moment of silence to settle students before starting
the day).
57. The sponsor of the bill firmly stated that his intent was not to return prayer to public
schools, while maintaining that "[t]his country was based on belief in God." Brown, 258 F.3d at 271.
Other senators also voiced concerns about the religious nature and purpose of the statute. Id. at 271-
72.
58. Brown, 258 F.3d at 284 (King, J., dissenting). The court also ignored the fact that the
Virginia legislature provided for legal defense of the moment of silence statute as a provision of that
statute. This provision suggests that the legislature was aware of the Establishment Clause issues
inherent in these statutes and intended to press the issue with the courts. Id. Combined with the
joint resolution, this provision suggests that the legislature was willing to try a number of different
tactics to restore prayer to the public classroom. Id.
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religious motives behind the statute seemed clear, the court found them
irrelevant and upheld the statute.59
Both circuit courts espoused a high level of deference to the legisla-
tive decision-making process when evaluating the stated secular purpose
of these moment of silence statutes.60 The willingness of these circuit
courts to turn a blind eye to legislative purpose 61 and to the history from
which these laws were born6 2 signals a frightening turn of events. While
legislatures are due some level of deference as a co-equal branch of gov-
ernment, an overly deferential approach robs the courts of their role in
upholding the constitutional rights of all citizens.
63
B. Invalidated-New Jersey and Louisiana
In contrast, two other courts of appeals have invalidated moment of
silence statutes as unconstitutional violations of the Establishment
Clause.64 In addition to representing the bookends of post-Jaffree mo-
ment of silence jurisprudence, 65 these cases also dealt with two very dif-
ferent statutes. While the wording of the statutes may not seem to be
59. Id. at 270-72. As in Georgia, the Virginia legislature seems willing to test the limit of
school prayer jurisprudence. Once certiorari was denied for Brown, the Virginia legislature intro-
duced a bill that would amend the statute to require school officials to expressly inform students of
the purpose of the moment of silence. The purpose, as stated by the statute, is to guarantee "the right
of every pupil to the free exercise of religion." See H.B. 135, 2002 Leg. (Va. 2002). Both houses of
the Virginia state legislature have also passed bills that would require public schools to post signs
reading "In God We Trust." See H.B. 108, 2002 Leg. (Va. 2002); S.B. 608, 2002 Leg. (Va. 2002).
These bills have now passed both Houses and were signed into law by Virginia's governor on May
17, 2002.
60. Bown, 112 F.3d at 1469; Brown, 258 F.3d at 276 (referring specifically to the level of
deference espoused by Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Jaffree).
61. The legislative history for both statutes has several examples of the religious motivations
of the sponsors and other supporters. State Senator Warren Barry, sponsor of the Virginia statute,
was asked about his intent for the moment of silence statute. He answered that "[t]his country was
based on belief in God, and maybe we need to look at that again." Brown, 258 F.3d at 271. An
unofficial transcript of the Georgia General Assembly reveals that a number of House members took
positions, for and against the statute, based on a belief that it would institute school prayer. Bown,
112 F.3d at 1467.
62. See infra Part IV.
63. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the courts have a duty to look into
legislative decisions in Free Exercise and Establishment Clause claims, to distinguish legitimate
secular purposes from ones that are merely a smokescreen for religious purposes. See, e.g., Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536
(1997) (stating that "Congress' discretion is not unlimited ... and the courts retain the power.., to
determine if Congress has exceeded its authority under the Constitution.").
64. May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985); Doe v. Sch. Bd., 274 F.3d 289 (5th Cir.
2001).
65. May was decided only months after Jaffree was decided, and School Board was just
decided in December 2001.
66. The text of the New Jersey statute provided:
§ 18A:36-4. Period of silence
Principals and teachers in each public elementary and secondary school of each school
district in this State shall permit students to observe a one minute period of silence to be
used solely at the discretion of the individual student, before the opening exercises of
each school day for quiet and private contemplation or introspection.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36-4 (West 1985).
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very different, their enactment was. The New Jersey statute, as chal-
lenged, was enacted as a whole; however, the Louisiana statute was
amended before passing.
Jaffree had only been law a few months when the Third Circuit
found that the New Jersey statute violated the Establishment Clause un-
der the Lemon test.67  While the court examined all three prongs of the
Lemon test, it found that the New Jersey statute only violated the first
prong, because it lacked a secular purpose.68  Unlike the courts that con-
sidered the Georgia and Virginia statutes, the Third Circuit was willing
to look beyond the purported secular legislative motive. The court held
that the secular purpose, "to provide a transition from nonschool life to
school life," was pretextual and therefore insufficient to save the statute
from an Establishment Clause challenge.69  In prior years, the New Jer-
sey legislature had attempted to reintroduce prayer into the public
schools a number of different ways, and the court took that history into
account when evaluating the stated purpose for the moment of silence
statute.
70
While the court did not find a legislative intent to encourage prayer
over other activities during the mandatory moment of silence, it did con-
clude that the "purpose of accommodating the religious beliefs of some
students is itself a religious purpose.' In the end, the court asked if it
was permissible for "the state .... while not endorsing prayer in prefer-
ence to other forms of silent activity, [to provide] for a minute of silence
for the purpose of permitting prayer by those who want to pray. 72 The
answer from the Third Circuit was a solid "no. 7 3
The text of the Louisiana statute provided:
§ 2115 [Silent prayer] Prayer or meditation; pledge of allegiance
A. Each parish and city school board in the state shall permit the proper school authorities
of each school within its jurisdiction to allow an opportunity, at the start of each school
day, for those students and teachers desiring to do so to observe a brief time in [silent]
prayer or meditation. The allowance of a brief time for [silent] prayer or meditation shall
not be intended nor interpreted as state support of or interference with religion, nor shall
such time allowance be promoted as a religious exercise and the implementation of this
Section shall remain neutral toward religion.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 17:2115(A) (West 1999) (emphasis added) (bracketed material deleted by
amendment).
67. May, 780 F.2d at 253.
68. Id. at 241 ("[This] appeal requires that we assess the impact on the district court's ruling
of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Wallace v. Jaffree") (citation omitted).
69. Id. at 251. The Third Circuit accepted the district court's finding that the purpose was
pretextual. Id.
70. Id. at 251-52. The court also considered testimony from educational experts and wit-
nesses at the legislative hearings before concluding that the stated purpose was but a sham. Id. at
252.
71. Id. at 252. The court goes on to state that a finding that the New Jersey statute was in-
tended to promote prayer was not sustainable, but that the purpose of accommodation of certain
religious beliefs was sufficient to render the statute unconstitutional. Id.
72. Id. at 252.
73. Id. at 253.
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In contrast to the New Jersey statute, the Louisiana statute originally
created a moment of silence, but was amended in an effort to restore
prayer to public classrooms. The statute was amended twice, first to add
the words "prayer or " 74 to the possible uses for the moment and later to
remove the word "silent ' 75 to allow for vocal prayer.76 In Doe, the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the statute as amended was un-
constitutional. 7 Drawing a comparison to Jaffree, the court found that
the only viable purpose for the 1999 amendment removing the word "si-
lent" was to "authorize verbal prayer in schools."78  Because the court
found no secular purpose for the statute, it did not consider the other
prongs of the Lemon test.
79
These four cases provide some guidance as to the constitutionality
of moment of silence statutes. However, the lack of clarity left after
Jaffree remains and the tension between two ideals endures. Although
courts must show appropriate deference to legislative decisions, they
must also fulfill their duty to ensure that those decisions are not based on
impermissible motives. The history of these statutes weighs heavily on
them, and courts must work harder to ignore that history than to consider
it. Part IV illustrates how, even with appropriate deference to legisla-
tures, courts must find moment of silence statutes unconstitutional.
IV. CAN A MOMENT OF SILENCE BE CONSTITUTIONAL: WHY JAFFREE
GOT IT RIGHT-AND HOW IT GOT IT WRONG
Jaffree seems to leave the constitutional door ajar concerning mo-
ment of silence laws. While the Court clearly stated that such laws are
unconstitutional when enacted for solely religious purposes, it does not
speak to laws with both religious and secular purposes. 80  The Court, in
both majority and concurring opinions, seems to suggest that such laws
might pass constitutional muster if they had a secular motive for their
74. Doe, 274 F.3d at 291 (citing the 1992 amendment).
75. Id. (citing the 1999 amendment).
76. The text of the Louisiana statute provided:
§ 2115 [Silent prayer] Prayer or meditation; pledge of allegiance
A. Each parish and city school board in the state shall permit the proper school authorities
of each school within its jurisdiction to allow an opportunity, at the start of each school
day, for those students and teachers desiring to do so to observe a brief time in [silent]
prayer or meditation. The allowance of a brief time for [silent] prayer or meditation shall
not be intended nor interpreted as state support of or interference with religion, nor shall
such time allowance be promoted as a religious exercise and the implementation of this
Section shall remain neutral toward religion.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 17:2115(A) (West 1999) (emphasis added) (bracketed material deleted by
amendment). The Louisiana State Legislature has since amended and re-enacted § 17:2115(A),
restoring the word "silent" to the statute. See Act of April 18, 2002, No. 56, § 17:2115(A), 2002 La.
Sess. Law Serv. 1 st Ex. Sess. (West) (amended and reenacted).
77. Doe, 274 F.3d at 290. Both the language of the statute and the legislative history of the
amendment supported this holding.
78. Id. at 294.
79. Id. at 293. The court also did not consider any endorsement or coercion issues.
80. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 66 (1985).
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enactment. 81 The Court does not, however, address the role the history
of moment of silence laws might play in the determination of whether
such laws are constitutional. As the Court does not squarely address the
issue, the question remains as to what fate such a law would face if a
clearly stated secular purpose were given for its enactment, either alone
or in tandem with a religious purpose.
While there might have been a time when moment of silence laws
could have been enacted in a constitutional manner, that time is past.
Regardless of any stated meaning by the legislature, the history of mo-
ment of silence laws is too uncomfortably blurred with school prayer.
This Part addresses the difficulties in applying the motivational test the
Court implies, as well as concerns of free exercise and the special role of
children in Establishment Clause issues. As the Court has yet to select a
single test for evaluating all Establishment clause challenges, this Article
will examine three of the "leading contenders:" the Lemon test, the en-
dorsement test, and the coercion test.
A. The Lemon Test: Silence with a Secular Purpose?
For more than 30 years, the Court has used a test, originally set
forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman,82 that examines three aspects of a statute
challenged as violating the Establishment Clause.83 The Court has con-
tinued to use this test, despite criticism from both within and outside the
Court, ever since.84 In Jaffree, the Court applied the Lemon test, but only
examined the first prong of the test-whether a statute has a secular pur-
pose for enactment. 85 The majority found that the clearly stated purpose
for the Alabama moment of silence law was to return prayer to the public
classroom. 86
81. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 66.
82. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
83. First, the statute must have a secular purpose; second, the statute cannot have the primary
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion; third, the statute cannot cause excessive entanglement
between religion and government. Id. at 612-13.
84. The Lemon test has indeed come under a great deal of fire from within the Court, with
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia being two of its more outspoken critics. See Lamb's
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-400 (1993) ("Like some ghoul in
a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeat-
edly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again .... "). But
see Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 63 (Powell, J., concurring) ("It [the Lemon test] is the only coherent test a
majority of the Court has ever adopted."); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 314
(2000) (citing Lemon as justification for examining the purpose of a policy); Steven G. Gey, Reli-
gious Coercion and the Establishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 463, 470 (1994) (arguing that
the "operative terms" of Lemon would serve to maintain church-state separation).
85. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 55-56. The second and third prongs of the Lemon test are not exam-
ined by courts in the same detail as the first prong when considering moment of silence laws. See Id.
Therefore, I will only examine the first prong in this Article.
86. Id. at 59-60.
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In applying the Lemon test, the Court first looks to see if the chal-
lenged statute has a secular purpose."' If a statute has both secular and
religious purposes, the secular purpose must be the primary purpose and
not merely pretextual. 88 However, the secular purpose need not be ex-
clusive; the Court has held that the government may "[recognize] the
important part that religion or religious organizations may play in resolv-
ing certain secular problems."8 9 Once the legislature establishes a secu-
lar purpose for a program or policy, the government's claim is generally
given deference.90 However, the secular purpose must be "sincere and
not a sham."9' If challenged, the validity of the secular purpose may be
evaluated by considering events surrounding the initial decision to enact
the statute.92
Moment of silence laws face a real problem concerning their pur-
pose of enactment. Jaffree has already established that if the statute is
passed solely to satisfy a religious purpose, such as returning prayer to
public schools, it cannot pass constitutional muster. But what about stat-
utes where the legislature claims a dual purpose for the statute-both
religious and secular-or even a purely secular purpose? The majority in
Jaffree seems to say that dual secular and religious purposes may pre-
serve the constitutionality of a moment of silence law.9 3 And if the legis-
lature claims solely a secular purpose for the statute, the first prong of the
Lemon test seems to be met.
But the secular purpose must not be a pretexual purpose, a sham, or
a cloth drawn over the eyes of the court. Courts have the duty to investi-
gate the stated secular purpose to ensure that it is a true purpose for the
statute. Although Congress (as well as state legislatures) must be given
deference in its decision-making, that deference cannot not be complete
if courts are to fulfill their duties. When examining or interpreting a
piece of legislation, the courts must consider the circumstances surround-
ing the creation of that statute as well as the stated goals of the legisla-
ture.94 Recently, the Court has shown its willingness to look beyond the
surface motivations of school officials to examine the true intent of pro-
87. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
88. Id.
89. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 607 (1988).
90. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596 (1987).
91 Id. at 587.
92. Id.
93. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 56. The majority does not make a clear statement about the constitu-
tionality of such a statute. Justice Stevens mentions the possibility of a secular motivation saving the
statute before moving on to definitively invalidate such statutes if motivated solely by religious
reasons. id.
94. See United States v. Champlin, 341 U.S, 290, 297 (1951) (stating that "[t]he statute cannot
be divorced from the circumstances existing at the time it was passed, and from the evil which
Congress sought to correct and prevent. The circumstances and the evil are well-known."). The
circumstances of any moment of silence law must necessarily include the ongoing struggle by some
political factions to restore prayer to public schools. See supro notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
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moting prayer in public schools in other related situations.95 The Court
must surely take the same care in probing behind stated purposes for the
legislative intent for moment of silence laws.
From the moment that prayer in public schools was held to be un-
constitutional, certain interest groups have been fighting for reinstate-
ment.96  On the federal level, numerous statutes and constitutional
amendments have been introduced that would restore prayer to public
schools in one form or another.97 These bills started by reintroducing
"prescribed prayer in public schools, [then moved] to prayer, to nonsec-
tarian prayer, to nondenominational prayer, to voluntary prayer, to a vol-
untary moment of silence.' 98 A proposed House amendment from 1971
shows the evolution of these bills from a call for a restoration of prayer
in schools to a moment of silence (intended for prayer).99 Congress has
also attempted to restrict the Supreme Court's jurisdiction in this area
with bills that would strip the Court of the power to hear "any case aris-
ing out of any state statute ... which relates to voluntary prayers in the
public schools and public buildings.
'1°°
On a state and local level, governments have supplemented federal
attempts to restore prayer to public classrooms. State legislatures con-
tinued to enact statutes mandating prayer in public schools, ignoring the
95. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 305-06. School officials attempted to allow student prayer before
each football game, claiming that the content of the message was up to the student. Id. The student
who was to deliver the message was elected by his or her peers, supposedly separating the potential
religious message and the school officials even further. Id. However, the Supreme Court refused to
allow the claim that the school was merely trying to "promote good sportsmanship" and invalidated
the program. Id.
96. The reaction to the school prayer decisions was sudden and vigorous. See Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962). The
day Engel was handed down was dubbed "Black Monday" in some quarters, and one senator went so
far as to say that "[tihe Supreme Court has made God unconstitutional." LYNN R. BUZZARD,
SCHOOLS: THEY HAVEN'T GOT A PRAYER 44 (1982). After Schempp was decided, numerous school
officials and state superintendents announced their decision to ignore the Supreme Court and pro-
ceed with various forms of prayer in their schools, calling those who supported the decision "athe-
ists, free thinkers, ultraliberals, a bunch of crackpots, and inverse bigots." Id. at 57.
97. These statutes and amendments have called for non-denominational prayers, voluntary
prayers and silent prayers, among other variations. Examples include the 1966 Dirksen Amendment
("providing for or permitting the voluntary participation of students or others in prayer"); the 1971
Wylie Amendment (supporting first nondenominational, then voluntary, prayer in public buildings);
and the 1981 Voluntary School Prayer Act (withdrawing jurisdiction from the Supreme Court in
claims relating to voluntary school prayers). Id. at 60-61, 67.
98. ROBERT S. ALLEY, SCHOOL PRAYER: THE COURT, THE CONGRESS, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 172 (1994). Two of the ncwcst forms this impulse has taken are moments of silence
and student-initiated, nondenominational, nonproselytizing prayers at events such as graduation. Id.
99. The original text of the 1971 amendment, introduced by Rep. Chalmers Wylie (Ohio),
was:
Section 1. Nothing contained in this Constitution shall abridge the right of persons law-
fully assembled, in any public building which is supported in whole or in part through the
expenditure of public funds, to participate in nondenominational prayer.
Id. at 169.
100. Donald E. Boles, Religion and the Public Schools in Judicial Review, in RELIGION: THE
STATE AND EDUCATION 49 (James E. Wood, Jr. ed., 1984).
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unconstitutionality of such statutes.1"' A number of state legislatures
also called for Congress to enact a "voluntary prayer amendment.
102
Some courts and commentators would infer that Jaffree stands for
the proposition that a moment of silence law is constitutional so long as
the legislature does not acknowledge its intent to restore prayer to public
schools. Among others, Justice O'Connor has voiced her concern of
courts giving too little deference toward legislative decisions.,0 3  While
Justice O'Connor may have "little doubt' 1°4 that the courts will be able to
winnow out the sham secular purposes from the legitimate ones, the ex-
treme level of deference she suggests for this investigation will hobble
most judges. This rationale forces a questionable situation on legisla-
tures and courts. If the Court really means to allow moment of silence
laws, on the condition that the legislature itself is silent about any reli-
gious purpose for the law, this creates an awkward and easily exploitable
situation for legislatures. Given the long history of the battle over prayer
in public schools, this rationale is absurd if moments of silence are but
the newest battlefield in that war.10 5 To uphold such statutes so long as
no religious purpose is stated, or at least is accompanied by a secular
purpose, encourages legislators to wink at the requirements of the Estab-
lishment Clause and bring school prayer back in disguise.
Even some commentators who argue that moment of silence laws
are or can be constitutional admit that the "political origin" of these laws
was the war over prayer in public schools. 10 6 While states may claim any
number of secular purposes for moment of silence laws, 107 it is unlikely
that states would pass any of these laws if the history of school prayer
were different or nonexistent.'0 8 These admissions, along with the his-
101. David Z. Seide, Daily Moments of Silence in Public Schools, 58 N.Y.U.L. REv. 364, 366-
67(1983).
102. See id. at 366. By 1983, six states had called for such an amendment-Illinois, Kansas,
Nevada, North Carolina, Virginia, and Washington. More have called for such an amendment since
then. See supra note 4.
103. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 74 ("[Tlhe inquiry into the purpose of the legislature in enacting a
moment of silence law should be deferential and limited.").
104. Id. at 75.
105. Douglas Laycock observes that "many legislatures and teachers have used these moments
of silence to officially encourage prayer," arguing that the problem with the laws is in the implemen-
tation, not the enactment. Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal
Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1986).
106. Laycock, for example, freely admits the origins of the moment of silence in public
schools, seeing them as direct "resistance to the Supreme Court's ban on school-sponsored prayer."
Id. at 5-6. He argues that despite this origin such laws can still be constitutional. Id.
107. Examples of secular purposes given for such laws include: to provide time for quiet re-
flection on the day ahead, to combat the problem evidenced by the violence at Columbine, to main-
tain order in the classroom, or to focus students on the coming day. See, e.g., Bown v. Gwinnett
County Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d 1464, 1472 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (stating that the secular purpose of the law
is "to provide students with a moment of quiet reflection to think about the upcoming day"); May v.
Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240, 244 (3d Cir. 1985) (suggesting a secular purpose of "providing a calm
transition from nonschool life to school work").
108. Laycock notes that these laws are clearly passed "in order to accommodate religious
thouht." Laycock, supra note 105, at 62.
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tory of these laws, make it difficult to see how a legislature could legiti-
mately claim a secular purpose. While a brief moment of silence at the
beginning of the school day may serve many purposes, legislators would
not attempt to mandate one if prayer had not been removed from public
schools.
B. Free Exercise Concerns
Proponents of moment of silence laws argue that without such laws,
public school students will be unable to pray during the school day, in
violation of their Free Exercise rights guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment. 10 9 However, this is a specious argument. Nothing in the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence prevents a public school
student from silently praying during a lull in school activities. Many
such moments occur during the regular school day-lunchtimes, the
moments between classes or lessons, the bus ride or walk to school. A
specially created moment is not required for students to have a chance to
exercise their right to silently pray."1
0
The Court has also held that when the Establishment and Free Exer-
cise clauses of the First Amendment come into conflict, the Establish-
ment Clause must predominate.' 1 ' Arguably, the combination of the two
clauses means that religious beliefs and practices are "altogether pri-
vate," making their intrusion into the public world of education im-
proper.112  Also, citizens claiming that their right to free exercise has
been violated must show how the government, through the enactment of
laws, has infringed on that right." 3 Public school students are expected
to keep their minds on their studies throughout the structured part of the
school day; they are allowed neither to pray nor to read the daily news-
paper. The free exercise of their religious practices is not singled out for
special treatment. On the other hand, students are permitted to engage in
109. In fact, at least one Justice in the Jaffree decision felt that this was a real danger. Justice
O'Connor voiced concerns about balancing the competing demands of the Free Exercise and Estab-
lishment Clauses. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 81-84 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
110. In fact, some might argue that more prayer occurs as a test is being handed out than during
any state-mandated moment. See Herdahl v. Pontotoc County Sch. Dist., 933 F. Supp. 582, 599
(N.D. Miss. 1996); T.C. Mattocks, Reflections on Santa Fe v. Doe: Is Student Prayer at Graduation
Still an Option?, 150 ED. LAW REP. 333, 334 (2001).
111. "[T]he Amendment embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The
first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be." Cantwell v. State of Conn., 310
U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). The Establishment Clause embodies the first concept; the Free Exercise
Clause the second.
112. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 52 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Rutledge, joined by Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton, argues that the word "religion" in
the First Amendment means just that-religious teaching, training, or practices-and is not to be
confused with a church. Id. This definition supports the theory that the prohibition that the Found-
ing Fathers sought to impose was broader than simply banning the establishment of an official
church by the government. Thus, encouraging prayer by students in public schools is just as forbid-
den as establishing one church as "official." Id.
113. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223 ("[l]t is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the
coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion.").
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any non-disruptive activity that they choose during the non-structured
parts of the day (i.e., the lunch period). Students who choose to pray or
read religious texts are certainly free to do so at these times; no specially
created "moment of silence" is needed to give students an opportunity
for these activities during the school day.
114
Claims that public students will be isolated from their religious be-
liefs are also difficult to credit. Supporters of moment of silence laws, or
of an actual return of vocal prayer to public classrooms, claim that stu-
dents are taught that their religion is false or unimportant by its lack of
presence in their daily curriculum.' 15 However, if parents and religious
institutions are unable to impart lasting religious instruction without the
presence of religion in a child's daily school life, it is unlikely that a mi-
nute of prayer each day is likely to alter that result."
16
C. Endorsement
Beyond the lack of a secular purpose, another problem with moment
of silence laws is the appearance of government endorsement of religion.
The Court sometimes uses an endorsement test," 7 instead of or in addi-
tion to the Lemon test.' 18 Under this test, the government cannot promote
or favor religion or give the appearance of promoting or favoring religion
in the eyes of a reasonable and informed observer." 9 Such endorsement
is prohibited because it would tend to express the idea that non-religious
114. One fallacy promoted by those who would restore prayer to public schools is that, as the
law now stands, students are prevented from silently praying on their own time during the school
day. Nothing in any of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause decisions prevents a student from
silently praying at lunch, between classes, or at other free moments during the day. See, e.g., Robert
M. O'Neil, Who Says You Can't Pray?, 3 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 347, 366 (1996) (stating "individ-
ual students may not be prevented from bowing their heads and praying during the school day");
John M. Swomley, Myths About Voluntary School Prayer, WASHBURN LJ. 294, 297 (1996) (stating
that the Supreme Court "did not attempt to prohibit individual silent prayer, or grace before meals or
audible prayer in informal settings such as a cafeteria").
115. Andrew W. Hall, A Moment of Silence: A Permissible Accommodation Protecting the
Capacity to Form Religious Belief, 61 IND. L.J. 429, 431-32 (1986). Hall suggests that students will
reject their religious beliefs if those beliefs are not reinforced by the public schools. He calls the
removal of religion from the public school curriculum "a negative form of religious training" and
fears that the public school children will have but an "ideological void" in their moral development.
Id. He discards the possibility that parents, in conjunction with religious institutions, can and should
be the source of more "positive" religious training, not the public schools. Id. Rather, he states that
without the presence of religious training in the public schools, students will be at the mercy of "the
beliefs of the instructor or the creation of a secular ideology" in forming their moral compass. Id. at
433.
116. The Court has specifically noted that the "preservation and transmission of religious
beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice committed to the private sphere." Santa Fe, 530
U.S. at 310 (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992)).
117. First articulated in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688-92 (1984) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring).
118. In fact, the endorsement test has been used as recently as 2000 by a majority of the Court
to examine an Establishment Clause challenge. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308.
119. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 776-77 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "when the reasonable observer would view a government
practice as endorsing religion .... it is our duty to hold the practice invalid").
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citizens, or citizens not of the faith being endorsed, are "outsiders, not
full members of the political community.' 20  Often, the Court looks to
"expression by the government itself ... or else government action al-
leged to discriminate in favor of private religious ... activity"'121 to de-
termine whether there has been an unconstitutional endorsement of relig-
ion. Justice O'Connor states the test for endorsement as "whether an
objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and im-
plementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of
prayer in public schools."' 22  While Justice O'Connor feels that moment
of silence laws, properly enacted, 23 could pass this test, such confidence
may be misplaced.
Silence can speak louder than legislators. Despite a hypothetical
legislature's silence as to any religious motive for a moment of silence
law, an objective observer can easily make the connection. With a long
history directly linking the emergence of these laws with the abolition of
prayer from the public schools,124 an objective observer cannotfhelp but
conclude that the legislative purpose behind these laws is to restore
school prayer. As students are already free to pray silently during any
momentary lull in the school day, setting aside a moment of silence spe-
cifically to accommodate prayer sends the message that religious belief,
or at least some forms of it, will be accommodated. 25 That the majority
of the community embraces the religious belief or practice that is favored
does not remove the constitutional concern and may in fact enhance it;
those in the community who do not embrace that, or any, religious belief
are also entitled to protection. 126 The very history of moment of silence
laws may make the appearance of government endorsement inevitable.
D. Coercion and Kids-a Special Situation
Under a third theory of evaluating Establishment Clause cases, the
Court looks to see if there is any sort of government coercion of religious
120. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
121. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 764.
122. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 76.
123. For the statute to be properly enacted, it would have to permit prayer but not specifically
endorse it. Id.
124. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
125. See Walter Dellinger, The Sound of Silence: An Epistle on Prayer and the Constitution, 95
YALE L.J. 1631, 1637 (1986). Dellinger, in this open letter to Congress, draws the connections
between the history of school prayer and moment of silence statutes. He sees the connection as even
clearer when the statute specifically mentions prayer as a possible activity during that moment. Id.
at 1636.
126. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 312. Protection of adherents of minority religions grows more
important each day, given our increasingly multi-cultural society. Ironically, this very diversity of
beliefs threatens some who would return prayer and other religious practices to our public schools.
After all, "the real problem is that Jews and atheists are pushing Christianity out of the public
schools." Marc W. Brown, Christmas Trees, Carols and Santa Claus, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 145, 163-64
(1999).
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practices. 27  No one may be forced to "support or participate in religion
or its exercise."'' 28 Even when individual choices appear to be involved,
the government must be careful that hidden coercion does not exist.,
29
Santa Fe recognized the powerful role that peer pressure can play in de-
termining the presence or absence of coercion. 130  Moment of silence
laws, especially when combined with the force of student peer pressure,
carry the risk of such coercion.'
31
The concern about the potential coercive effect of moment of si-
lence statutes takes on deeper nuances because of the audience in-
volved-children. The Court has repeatedly voiced concerns about the
potential for government coercion when the challenged statute involves
schools and/or children, 132 and has even considered mandatory school
attendance coercive government action.1 33 Government action need not
involve direct coercive pressure to participate in religious practices, but
may instead be more subtle, indirect coercion. 34 In decisions as early as
Lemon, the Court focused on "[the] process of inculcating religious doc-
127. Justice Kennedy has been a recent champion of a coercion test in the Court's Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence. He first articulated this view in Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 660-
63 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As part of this test, Justice Ken-
nedy states that government may not advance religion through coercive action. Id. This test remains
in use, as recently as 2000. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302.
128. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 314.
129. Coercion does not always need to be overt; the circumstances surrounding a given act
might result in coercion even if none is obvious or intended. "When the power, prestige and finan-
cial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pres-
sure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain."
Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,431 (1962).
130. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 317 ("[T]he government may no more use social pressure to enforce
orthodoxy than it may use more direct means.").
131. Justice Kennedy has noted the special problems inherent in dealing with students, realiz-
ing that the "line between voluntary and coerced participation may be difficult to draw." Bd. of
Educ. Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 261-62 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part). Other courts have also noted the difficulty in establishing that participation in religious activi-
ties is truly voluntary, when the participants are minors. See, e.g., Doe v. Porter, 188 F. Supp. 2d
904, 913 (E.D. Tenn. 2002).
132. The Ninth Circuit recently noted the Supreme Court's special attention to Establishment
Clause cases involving public schools and children. See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597,
605 (9th Cir. 2002). The court is concerned that the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, including
the phrase "under God," will have a coercive effect on the children forced to either recite or at least
listen to the Pledge on a daily basis. The "age and impressionability of schoolchildren, and their
understanding that they are required to adhere to the norms set by their school, their teacher and their
fellow students" are of especial concern to the court. Id. at 611. The Ninth Circuit found that the
inclusion of the words "under God" in the Pledge was unconstitutional under all three tests the
Supreme Court has used to evaluate Establishment Clause cases, including the Lemon test. Id. at
611. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that Newdow lacked standing to chal-
lenge the Pledge on his daughter's behalf. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct.
2301, 2312 (2004).
133. Lisa Ness Seidman, Religious Music in the Public Schools: Music to Establishment
Clause Ears?, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 466, 482 n.127 (1997) (citing Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 584;
McCollum, 333 U.S. 212). The Court has also taken notice of the special role public schools play in
our society, pointing out the need for education free of divisive elements such as religious tenets. Id.
at n. 125.
134. Id. at 483-84. She notes that the Court has held indirect coercion-specifically the re-
quirement to attend school-to be enough for a governmental practice to violate the Establishment
Clause. Id. at 484 n.150 (citing Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223).
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trine [being] enhanced by the impressionable age of the pupils, in pri-
mary schools particularly."' 35 In Jaffree, both the majority 36 and Justice
O'Connor's concurrence' 37 raise concerns about the special challenges of
mixing religion, government, and children.'
38
This concern for the special coercive pressure faced by students
should not be lightly dismissed. While Justice O'Connor may "discern
[no] serious threat to religious liberty"'139 from the creation of a daily
moment of silence, the impressionability of school children cannot be
discounted when evaluating these statutes. Supporters of moment of
silence statutes argue that there is no coercive effect and therefore no
Establishment Clause issue with them because silence is not inherently
religious in nature. 14  While pure silence may not be inherently reli-
gious, the history of these statutes lends an association between prayer
and silence that dooms these statutes regardless of their exact wording.
141
As explained above, the road that legislatures have traveled to arrive at
moment of silence laws has been a long one-one directly linked to re-
storing prayer in public schools. 142 Such laws were never even consid-
ered until the Supreme Court held that mandatory prayer in public school
classrooms was unconstitutional. 14
135. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616. The Court continues to stress the importance of taking great care
when evaluating Establishment Clause issues that involve children. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 592 (1992); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985) ("The symbolism of a union
between church and state is most likely to influence children of tender years, whose experience is
limited and whose beliefs consequently are the function of environment as much as of free and
voluntary choice."); Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 583-84.
136. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 61 n.51.
137. Id. at 81.
138. Concern about religious coercion of public school students also arises in a number of
other settings. For example, the role of religious music in public school choirs and music classes has
provided a battleground for those who would restore prayer to public schools. See, e.g. Seidman,
supra note 133. Seidman explores the role of religious music in public schools, especially the case
of Bauchman v. West High Sch., 900 F. Supp. 254 (D. Utah 1995). She draws an analogy to moment
of silence laws. Siedman, supra note 133, at 485. The Supreme Court has yet to decide how reli-
gious music and public schools may intersect the Establishment Clause, specifically denying certio-
rari n the Bauchman case. See also Skarin v. Woodbine Community Sch. Dist., 204 F. Supp. 2d
1195 (S.D. Iowa 2002) (challenging the school's practice of having students sing the Lord's Prayer
during graduation ceremony). Student-led prayers at the beginning of high school football games
have, however, already drawn the censure of the Court. Santa Fe, 520 U.S. at 317.
139. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 73. Commentators have also drawn on O'Connor's language to
downplay any potential coercion from a moment of silence. See, e.g. Johnson, School Prayer and
the Constitution: Silence is Golden, 48 MD. L. Rev. 1018, 1037-39 (1989). Of course, some of the
individuals striving to return prayer to public schools tend not to see any religiously motivated act as
much of a threat and may be somewhat biased in their appraisal of a moment of silence. See, e.g.,
Brown, supra note 126, at 160 (noting that members of a group opposed to the removal of religious
celebrations from the public schools didn't see that "singing 'Silent Night' [in the public schools]
puts you on the radical edge").
140. Johnson, supra note 139, at 1037-39.
141. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
142. See supra Part IV(A).
143. See BUZZARD, supra note 96, at 58 (noting a total of 147 amendments introduced in
Congress to overturn Engel alone). Further, moment of silence laws in their current forms did not
even become a possibility until legislatures had tried a number of mandatory and voluntary vocal
prayer statutes, most of which were struck down as unconstitutional. See, e.g., ALLEY, supra note
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Finally, the implementation of moment of silence laws may inad-
vertently coerce students. While most statutes allow students to do
whatever they wish during that moment, some students will receive the
message that the time is set aside for them to pray. Whether they receive
that message from their parents or their preacher, those students may
look askance at a fellow student who instead chooses to spend one more
minute catching up on his math homework, who pulls out her Harry Pot-
ter book to read a few more pages, or who steps into the hall to avoid
feeling coerced to pray.144 Some students may even receive the message
that prayer is the favored way to spend the minute from their teachers or
other school officials, lending weight to the idea that any student who
visibly chooses not to pray is doing something wrong. 145  Peer pressure
from these students will make those who choose not to pray uncomfort-
able and may force them into doing something they would rather not-
pray or, at least, pretend to pray. t46 Finally, state legislatures in Virginia
and Georgia have already begun to send the message that prayer is the
favored activity during the mandatory moment of silence, lending more
coercive weight to the implementation of these laws. 1
47
The threat of student coercion resulting from a moment of silence in
the morning may be small, but even small threats to the values embodied
in the Constitution must be taken seriously. 148 Peer pressure among stu-
98, at 175 (noting an attempt to change voluntary prayer to a moment of silence in a proposed
amendment). This progression suggests that some legislators who seek to circumvent Engel and
related decisions are willing to take small steps backward, until they find the maximum amount of
school prayer that is permitted by the Constitution.
144. Some students are already feeling the coercive effects of moment of silence statutes.
Jordan Kupersmith, a Virginia high school student, spends the beginning of each day in his princi-
pal's office rather than participate in the moment of silence. Kupersmith feels that the law is "un-
fair" and promotes prayer as a favored classroom activity. See Gotta Minute? Virginia Enacts Min-
ute of Silence in Schools, WEEKLY READER, Jan. 26, 2001, at 3.
145. After the Supreme Court denied certiorari for Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265 (4th Cir.
2001), the Loudoun County Virginia School Board decreed that students must be told "at least twice
a year that they may pray ... during the state-mandated daily minute of silence." See Rosalind S.
Helderman, Principals Must Explain Moment of Silence Rights, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2001, at TO1.
The motion to require this emphasis on the right to pray was inspired by the September 11 th terrorist
attacks. Id. One board member said that the time was right for this emphasis, given the "calls to
meditation and prayer by all of our leaders" following the attacks. Id.
146. Religious activities associated with the school outside the moment of silence lend weight
to the peer pressure in the classroom. In Florida, after a student organized a "religious-outreach
opportunity" at his school, he found that his "biggest reward" was that "[k]ids who used to crack
jokes during the daily moment of silence now hold their tongues." Jodie Morse, Letting God Back
In, TiME, Oct. 22, 2001, at 71. The implication in this new silence is that the school has sent the
message that prayer is the appropriate or favored way to spend the moment of silence, and that
dissenters may face consequences.
147. See supra notes 53 and 59.
148. The Court has expressed concern over the idea that small violations of the Constitution are
somehow less important, or that they do not cause any great damage to our national values. Justice
Black cited James Madison, the author of the First Amendment, who wrote:
(I)t is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties .... Who does not see
that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Relig-
ions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of
all other Sects? That the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three
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dents is a powerful force, and the underlying history of these moments of
silence may lead to pressure--overt or covert-on students to pray dur-
ing these moments. The fact that moment of silence laws do not support
or denounce any particular religion does not mean that the general gov-
ernment support for religion should be ignored.
V. CONCLUSION
Our Constitution guarantees that individuals will not be forced to
participate in religious activities against their own beliefs. It also guaran-
tees that the government-both at the state and federal levels-will not
use its power to establish an official religion, nor to favor religion over
non-religion. This constitutional guarantee must be at its strongest in our
public schools. Without a firm separation between church and state,
impressionable students may feel coerced into religious activities and
beliefs.
Moment of silence laws are but the current waypoint on the long
school-prayer journey that started with Engel.149 To uphold these laws,
with their roots in mandatory prayer, as constitutional is a serious crack
in the wall separating church and state, and for courts to look the other
way, while legislators obscure their religious motivations, is to promote a
farce that damages our constitutional guarantees.
pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to
conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962). The Court has also expressed concern about a whittling
down of our constitutional protections in other instances. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 29 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (concerned that "with time the most solid freedom stead-
ily gives way before continuing corrosive decision").
149. Other contemporary challenges to the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on public life and
prayer include school voucher programs and displays of the Ten Commandments. In Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002), the Supreme Court upheld a Cleveland, Ohio voucher
program. The Court held that the program was neutral with respect to religion, and therefore did not
violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 2473. While most voucher systems permit the use of the
funds in both secular and sectarian schools, Justice Souter's dissenting opinion pointed out that the
vast majority of voucher students, and therefore voucher money, go to sectarian schools. Id. at 2494-
95 (Souter, J., dissenting). Another current tactic for those who would restore prayer to public life is
the posting of the Ten Commandments in public buildings, such as courthouses. Numerous chal-
lenges to such postings have arisen across the country. See, e.g., Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d
1290 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (challenging the installation of a monument engraved with the Ten Com-
mandments in the Alabama State Judicial Building); ACLU v. Mercer County, 219 F. Supp. 2d 777
(E.D. Ky. 2002) (challenging the posting of a framed copy of the Ten Commandments in the county
courthouse).
